Failed Iran Hostage Rescue Continues to Teach Lessons 45 Years Later

Following Operation Eagle Claw, the 1980 Iran hostage rescue attempt, significant lessons were learned, including the need for the creation of a U.S. Special Operations Command and improved joint training, planning and execution.  

45 years after Operation Eagle Claw, those lessons, as well as the professionalism and dedication of the service members involved in the ill-fated mission, were remembered during a ceremony held at Arlington National Cemetery. 

Operation Lead-Up 

On Jan. 16, 1979, the pro-American Iranian government under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi abdicated. In the weeks that followed, the U.S. evacuated about 54,000 military and civilians from Iran as Islamic fundamentalists, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, fomented anti-American demonstrations. 

Ten months later, on Nov. 4, 1979, armed Iranians stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 66 American hostages, 13 of whom were later released. The remaining 53 were held hostage in the months that followed as the CIA and Pentagon began planning for a rescue, code-named Operation Eagle Claw. 

Eagle Claw, an extremely complex operation, depended on everything going according to plan. Any deviation could cause the entire operation to unravel with possibly tragic consequences. 

Operation Planning 

President Jimmy Carter authorized the operation’s execution. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, believing the operation would fail, resigned several days later. 

The plan called for three Air Force MC-130 transport aircraft carrying 132 Army Rangers and Delta Force soldiers and three Air Force EC-130s carrying supplies and fuel to take off from Masirah Island, Oman, to a remote salt flat, designated Desert One, 200 miles southeast of Tehran. 

Rendezvousing with those aircraft would be eight Navy RH-53D helicopters from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz in the Arabian Sea. 

After refueling and loading the assault team, the helicopters would fly to a mountainous location 65 miles from Tehran, where the assault team would go into hiding. The next night, the team, dependent upon trusted agents, drivers and translators, would be picked up and driven the rest of the way to the embassy compound.  

After storming the embassy, the team and the freed hostages would rally at either the embassy compound or a nearby soccer stadium to be picked up by the helicopter force.  

The helicopters would then transport them to Manzariyeh, Iran, 35 miles south, secured by a team of rangers. From there, Air Force C-141 transport aircraft would fly the assault team and hostages out of Iran. At the same time, the rangers would destroy the remaining equipment, including the helicopters, and prepare for their own aerial departure.  

In the weeks before the mission, Air Force combat controllers covertly deployed into Iran to prepare the landing site at Desert One. 

The entire operation was to be carried out at night. 

“This mission required a lot of things we had never done before. We were literally making it up as we went along,” said retired Air Force Col. Bob Brenci, the lead MC-130 pilot on the mission. 

Flying using night-vision goggles was almost unheard of then, he said. 

Operation Execution 

The mission began on April 24, 1980, with the arrival of the MC-130s at Desert One. The plan almost immediately began to unravel. 

At Desert One, a passenger bus approached the landing zone. The advance party was forced to stop the vehicle and detain its 44 passengers. Then, a fuel truck approached, and when it failed to stop, a soldier fired an antitank weapon at it, which set the tanker on fire and lit the surrounding area. Then, a pickup truck approached but turned around. 

Despite these intrusions, the assault team commanders decided to continue with the mission.  

As for the helicopters, two aborted because of flight instrument and mechanical problems, while the pilot of a third continued to Desert One despite experiencing hydraulic problems. The remaining helicopters encountered a severe dust storm, which delayed their arrival at Desert One by an hour. 

Once at Desert One, the RH-53D with hydraulic problems could not be repaired, which left the team with just five helicopters available. Since there weren’t enough helicopters to ensure success, the on-scene commander aborted the mission and released the detained bus passengers. 

The plan then shifted to getting the assault team back on the MC-130s while the helicopters refueled and returned to the Nimitz. 

At that point, tragedy struck. One of the helicopter’s rotor blades collided with a fuel-laden EC-130. Both aircraft exploded, killing five of the 14 airmen on the EC-130 and three of the five Marine crew of the RH-53D. 

The team commanders ordered the remaining helicopters abandoned and everyone to board the EC-130s, which soon departed for Masirah Island. That concluded the operation. 

In a propaganda ploy, the wreckage at Desert One was televised by the Iranian government. 

The hostages were subsequently detained in multiple places in Iran to prevent a second rescue attempt. 

The remains of the eight U.S. service members killed were returned to the U.S. on May 6, 1980. 

In the remaining months of his presidency, Carter continued negotiating for the hostages’ release, but the government of Iran did not release them until the day of President Ronald Reagan’s inauguration, Jan. 20, 1981. 

The hostages had been held for 444 days. 

Lessons Learned 

Air Force Lt. Gen. David H. Tabor, deputy chief of staff for Air Force plans and programs, spoke today at Arlington National Cemetery beside the Iran Rescue Mission Memorial. 

Tabor said some of the men thought they wouldn’t make it back alive. 

“They pressed on in spite of this notion that something might go wrong,” he said. “That’s what you call courage. It’s not the absence of fear, but it’s the willingness to carry on in spite of it. And I think it’s the most admirable trait that one can have in conflict.” 

He said the professionalism of those airmen, Marines, soldiers and sailors is legendary. 

“Their perseverance in the face of chaos and uncertainty honed the edge of battlefield successes ever since that night. They have come to epitomize what we hold most dear, not only in [special operations forces], but in the military service at large, the ability to come together as a joint team and truly put service before self, and to have the guts to try. And even when it doesn’t go your way, and the elements conspire against success, to turn that tragedy into the lesson it is for generations to come is nothing but inspiring.” 

Also speaking today at Arlington Cemetery was retired Marine Corps Maj. Steven W. Kirtley, who was a corporal on duty at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Nov. 4, 1979, when he and 52 other Americans were taken hostage. He recalled being woken up by half a million people outside the embassy screaming and shouting, “Death to America, death to Carter.” Within a few hours, they were taken hostage. 

After months without news, the hostages were told about the rescue efforts. 

Kirtley said, “We knew there was a rescue attempt and that we weren’t forgotten. And then we felt heartbreak at the same time when we found out that eight heroes had been killed and dozens more had been injured in that attempt. I’ve got three grown sons, and I can’t imagine what it’s like to be a parent and to lose a son or a daughter in that manner.” 

In a ceremony yesterday at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, Air Force Col. Jeff McMaster, deputy commander of the 27th Special Operations Wing, said, “We honor their efforts today and for having the guts to try. The legacy of Operation Eagle Claw reaches far beyond the incident at Desert One.” 

McMaster said the operation led to the Holloway Report, an investigation into the failures behind Eagle Claw, commissioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  

“The report had a profound impact on the U.S. military and would eventually lead to the creation of a unified special operations command, known today as United States Special Operations Command,” he said. 

Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, Socom commander, spoke to veterans and guests of the operation during an Eagle Claw Auditorium dedication ceremony, April 16, 2025, at Joint Special Operations University on MacDill Air Force Base, near Tampa, Florida. 

“Your courage didn’t just inspire change — it forced change,” Fenton said. “The operation granted us a mindset that lasts until today, a mindset of relentless improvement. The legacy of relentless growth and development is still alive.” 

The general said crisis response is still Socom’s sacred obligation and would not be possible without Eagle Claw. 

“Know that you played an indispensable part in our history. Your courage didn’t just inspire change — it forced change. You made us and the entire U.S. military better. You forged the foundation for modern special operations,” he said. 

Retired Army Command Sgt. Maj. Nick Nickel, a sergeant first class at the time, was inside the burning EC-130. He said the troops made an orderly exit as best they could, helping each other out.  

A lot of bravery was exhibited that day, he said, but no medals for valor were ever awarded because Carter deemed it a humanitarian operation. 

Retired Marine Corps Lt. Col. Ed Seiffert was an RH-53D pilot during the operation. He said they conducted covert night flights at Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona in the weeks leading up to the operation. However, he said the operation planners hadn’t accounted for the reliability of the helicopters. 

Seiffert said that during any given six-hour flying mission, there is a 40% chance that something will break or go wrong. Aboard ship or on land, the birds can return to the ship or base to get new parts or repairs, but on a long mission like the one to Iran, that’s not an option. 

One of his mechanics asked him about the return trip to the Nimitz. Seiffert replied to the Marine, “These aircraft are never coming back, none of them.” 

Retired Air Force Lt. Col. Russ Tharp, an EC-130 pilot, said in the weeks leading up to the operation, they practiced landing on a dry lakebed at Edwards Air Force Base, California. He had to shut down one of his engines on the return trip out of Desert One due to a malfunction. 

Keith Morrow, one of the rangers who participated in the operation, said in a 2020 interview, “Some would call this operation a complete failure, but was it really? Our challenges were new and difficult at all levels across the military, but our failure in Iran made us better. We established commands, units, relationships, mission sets and joint tactics, techniques and procedures that survive to this day.”